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Filial Support and Family Solidarity
JAMES L. LOPES*
Honor thy father and thy mother that thy days may be long in the
land that the Lord thy God giveth thee. Exodus 20:12.
The concept of filial responsibility has existed for many centuries.
Although the origins of this moral tenet will probably never be identi-
fied with any degree of precision, the origin of the legal responsibility
to provide for one's parents is more readily traceable. Statutes which
presently exist in a majority of American states are essentially identical
to the "responsible relatives" statute found in the seventeenth century
Elizabethan Poor Law. Prior to the enactment of -this comprehensive
statutory scheme to deal with the problems of the poor, there was no
legal duty imposed on children to provide for their indigent parents'
support.
The responsible relatives statutes embrace more than merely the
child-parent relationship. They are concerned also with the duties of
parent to child, husband to wife, and wife to husband. Additionally,
some impose duties beyond this immediate family sphere, extending
the obligation of support to grandparents and grandchildren and even
brothers and sisters of the indigent. The focus of this article, however,
is on the legal responsibility of children to contribute to the support
of their parents and the wisdom of the imposition of this duty.
* B.S., 1969, University of California, Davis; J.D., 1974, University of the Pa-
cific, McGeorge School of Law; LL.M., 1975, Harvard Law School. Member, State Bar
of California. The author was Editor-in-Chief of the Pacific Law Journal during 1973-
74, and is associated with the firm of Gendel, Raskoff, Shapiro and Quittner, Los Ange-
les, California.
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At the outset, a brief history of the advent of the responsible rela-
fives statute, as contained in the Elizabethan Poor Law, is set forth.
Discussion then turns to an examination of the historical context of the
origin of this statute, as well as the adoption of its prototype in
America. Present state and federal law will also be reviewed to de-
termine the current impact of these statutes. Next, an attempt is made
to answer the obvious question of why these responsible relatives stat-
utes have remained in existence, with little change, for close to four
hundred years. This will entail an analysis of various economic, social,
and cultural factors which existed in American society and which led
to -the perpetuation of these laws. The author concludes that these
laws were perpetuated, not so much because of public acceptance, but
because there was little reason or motivation to challenge these laws
due to the economic and societal structure of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. Recent changes in many of these same social and
economic factors are then used as a basis to challenge the continued
application of filial support laws.
Additionally, an analysis of these statutes will be made in light of
their sociological, psychological, and economic effects on family mem-
bers and family relationships. Whether such laws hinder or help
family relationships will be examined as well as whether or not these
laws help to perpetuate poverty. Also to be examined are the adminis-
trative problems relating to the enforcement of these statutes and the
costs of such administration balanced against income produced by the
program.
Finally, various constitutional arguments that have been asserted in
opposition to these laws will be addressed. Many challenges have
been raised over the years, running from arguments based on pro-
cedural due process, double taxation, and an unconstitutional taking,
to more recent arguments based on a denial of equal protection. All
but one challenge has been unsuccessful, and the one success turned
out to be very limited.
HISTORY OF FILIAL SUPPORT LAWS
The Elizabethan Poor Law of 16011 was not the result of creative
genius on the part of its authors but rather the culmination of almost
three centuries of governmental efforts to deal effectively with the
problems of the poor.2 One seeking a starting point for the study of
1. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1601).
2. tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development,
and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 258 (1964) [hereinafter cited as tenBroek].
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public assistance as we know it today would logically begin with the
Statute of Labourers,3 which was enacted in 1349; with it begins a
chain of related circumstances which leads to our present system. 4 The
traditional approach of government to the problems of poverty was
negative, both in attitude and action. Statutes were punitive and re-
pressive and sought generally to solve the problems relating to the
supply of labor by discouraging idleness and punishing beggars.; A
positive approach was not provided by the government, but instead ac-
tual financial assistance was provided solely by religious and private
philanthropy. The church was the primary source of aid to the poor.
Secondary assistance was forthcoming from guilds and private founda-
tions. The growing inability of these private sources to cope with the
changing conditions gave rise to greater and greater need for public
financial assistance. The need became critical in the last half of the
sixteenth century when Henry VIII expropriated the monasteries and
gave this property to his followers, thus eliminating what had been a
major source of assistance to the poor.
Finally an affirmative approach to public financial assistance was
provided for in the 1601 Act.6 Nevertheless, the punitive approach
to dealing with poverty was retained. The nature and cause of the
1601 Act has been described by tenBroek:
Historically it may be viewed as all of the following, whatever
the apparent contradictions: the outcome of the inadequacy and
disruption of nongovernmental sources of charitable aid; an eco-
nomic, social, and political necessity in the century of the Tudors;
3. Ordinance of Labourers, 2 Edw. 3, c. I-VI (1349).
4. Standard works on the development of the English Poor Law include E. LEON-
AlD, T EARLy HISTORY OF ENGLISH POOR RELIEF (1900); K. DE SCHwENrrz, ENG-
LAND'S ROAD TO SocmL SEcunnY (1943); B. TIERNEY, MEDIEVAL POOR LAw (1959);
and 1 B. WEBB, ENGLISH LoCAL GOVERNMENT: ENGLISH POOR LAw HISTORY (1927).
The California Welfare and Institutions Code contains extensive provisions for the pub-
lic support of families with dependent children, CAL. WaL'. & INST. CODE ch. 2 (com-
mencing with §11200), as well as the aged, blind, and disabled, CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE ch. 3 (commencing with §12000). In the context of familial support for such
persons, section 206 of the Civil Code imposes a general duty of support upon the chil-
dren of a person in need who is unable to maintain himself by work. In addition, the
Welfare and Institutions Code provides that each adult child shall contribute to the sup-
port of a needy parent in an amount determined by an income-graduated scale; if there
is more than one adult child the statutory requirement is prorated among them. The
responsible relative's contribution is paid directly to the state, which thereupon transmits
such payments to the recipient. If an adult child living within the state fails to contrib-
ute to the support of his parent, the state may proceed civilly against such child. Upon
request, the Attorney General may bring the action in the superior court of the county
of residence of the responsible relative to recover that portion of aid granted to the par-
ent that the child is held liable to pay and to secure an order for payment of future
sums. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE art. 8 (commencing with §12350). See also Beilenson
& Agran, The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, 3 PAC. L.J. 475 (1972).
5. K. DE SCHwErNrrz, ENGLAND'S RoAD TO SOCIAL SEcuRmr 2 (1943); B. TIER-
NEY, MEDIEvAL POOR LAW 132 (1959).
6. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1601).
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aimed more at civil disorder than at economic distress; oriented
toward the fading agrarian age rather than the urban industrial
poverty that was its principal instigating cause; overemphasized the
personal causes of poverty and sought to solve them by excessive
doses of criminal law; recognized the economic causes of poverty
and sought to overcome them by providing work through govern-
ment made or sheltered employment; a great code of social legisla-
tion and a landmark of social progress.7
The legal responsibility of relatives did not appear until 1597,8 but
became an integral part of the legislation of 1601.
The father and grandfather, the mother and grandmother, and the
children of every poor old blind lame and impotent person, or other
person not able to work, being of sufficient ability, shall at their
own charges relieve and maintain every such poor person, in that
manner and according to that rate, as by the Justices of the Peace
of that county where such sufficient persons dwell, or the greater
number of them, at their general Quarter Sessions shall be as-
sessed; upon pain that every one of them shall forfeit twenty shill-
ings for every month which they shall fail therein.O
Although no explicit statement of legislative purpose accompanied the
enactment of the responsible relatives statute, commentators and the
judiciary have agreed that the purpose of the statute was to relieve the
public from some of the expense of public assistance by introducing
liability on the part of certain relatives for support.10 Although Black-
stone referred to the statute as if it were declaratory of existing prin-
ciples of law," Kent later surmised that its primary purpose was pro-
tection of the public purse, 2 and the American courts have followed
this view.
13
The enactment of poor laws in the American states was idiosyncratic,
and no attempt will be made to explore the various paths that were
taken."4 Suffice it to say that most states adopted, with very little
change, the principle of relatives' responsibility found in the Eliza-
7. tenBroek, supra note 2, at 260 (citation omitted).
8. 39 Eliz. 1, c. 3, §VJI (1597).
9. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, §VI (1601).
10. See tenBroek, supra note 2, at 286; Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under
the American Poor Laws, 54 MICH. L. Rv. 497, 500-01 (1956).
11. 1 W. BrAcEToNE, CoMMENTARIEs, Parent and Child 449 (1916).
12. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARMS 191 (14th ed. 1896).
13. See, e.g., Tulin v. Tulin, 124 Conn. 518, 200 A. 819 (1938); People v. Hill,
163 Il. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896); Ketcham v. Ketcham, 176 Misc. 993, 29 N.Y.S.2d
773 (1941).
14. See generally 1 E. ABBoa'r, PuBLic AssisTANca (1966); tenBroek, supra note
2; Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance, 43 CAL. L. Rpy. 175
(1955).
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bethan Poor Law.15 A few contracted the sphere of liability to elimi-
nate grandparents or children, while others extended the scope of lia-
bility to include grandchildren or brothers and sisters of the poor per-
son.
18
Various economic and social forces were responsible for a minimum
use of filial support laws in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.17
With the coming of the twentieth century, the usage of these statutes
began to rise. The depression of the 1930's gave rise to the enactment
of the Old Age Assistance Program (hereinafter referred to as OAA),
a joint federal-state project administered by the states under broad
guidelines imposed by the federal government.18 The OAA would
have seemingly given the 36 states which had filial support laws at that
time' 9 a systematic manner in which to apply these laws. However,
at the time, these statutes were under substantial professional attack,
and, being difficult to administer besides, their enforcement was gen-
erally neglected. 20  At the close of the Second World War there was
renewed interest in the enforcement of filial support laws, stimulated
by sharply rising public assistance costs.21 The postwar period was
characterized by clarification of the law and policy to facilitate enforce-
ment. Although there was an increased interest in the enforcement
of filial support §tatutes during the last two decades in states where they
15. The California statute provides that
it is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any person in need
who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the
extent of their ability. The promise of an adult child to pay for necessaries
previously furnished to such person is binding. A person who is receiving aid
to the aged shall be deemed to be a person in need who is unable to maintain
himself by work.
CAL. CIV. CODE §206. See generally ALA. CODE tit. 44, §8 (1927); ALASKA STAT. §§25.-
20.030 (1949), 47.25.240 (1953); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-10-7 (1963); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §17-320 (1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §501 (1955); GA. CODE
ANN. §23-2302 (1909); IDAHO CODE ANN. §32-1002 (1899); IND. ANN. STAT. §31-2-9-
1 (1973); IowA CODE ANN. §252.2 (1939); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 229 (1970); LA.
REV. STAT. §13.4731 (1910); ME. RPv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §4467 (1954); Miss. CODE
ANN. §43-21-35 (1917); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§71-233, 71-234 (1953); NEV. REV.
STAT. §422.310 (1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§167.2 (1969), 167.3 (1973); N.J. REv.
STAT. §44:1-140 (1968); N.D. CENT. CODE §§14-09-10, 50-01-10 (1943); ORE. REv.
STAT. §§109.010, 416.010 et seq. (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §1971 et seq. (1937):
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§15-11-7, 15-11-9 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §71-131 (1952); S.D.
CODE §25-7-27 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. §17-14-1 (1943); VA. CODE ANN. §20-88
(1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. §9-11-5 (1936).
16. For a listing of books and articles detailing the development of public assist-
ance in particular states see Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assist-
ance, 43 CAL. L. REv. 175, 175 n.1 (1955).
17. See text accompanying notes 31-69 infra.
18. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, §1 et seq., 49 Stat. 620, reproduced at 42 U.S.C.
§301 et seq. (1970).
19. A listing of these states appears in Abbott, Abolish the Pauper Laws, 8 Soc.
SERV. REv. 1, 15 n.17 (1934).
20. A. SCHORR, FILIAL RESPONSIDILrIY IN THE MODERN AmERICAN FAMILY 23
(published by U.S. Dep't of HEW) (1960) [hereinafter cited as ScHoRR].
21. Id.
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existed, there was also a gradual decline in the number of states in
which these laws remained. Presently, twenty-seven states require
children to contribute to the support of their needy parents.22 It would
seem that a significant increase in political influence of groups sympa-
thetic to the plight of the elderly, coupled with a growing recognition
of the strain such laws have on family relations, led to the repeal of
these statutes in several states.
Recent federal legislation has had a significant impact on the impor-
tance of filial support laws. Supplemental Security Income for the
Aged, Blind and Disabled (hereinafter referred to as SSI) became ef-
fective on January 1, 1974.23 SSI supplants OAA, the former federal-
state program for the aged.24 Under the state administered OAA pro-
gram, the states were able to apply their filial support statutes to re-
quire contributions from children of those receiving OAA grants. In
contrast, SSI is federally administered and has no provision for filial
recoveries. 25  The enactment of SSI and repeal of OAA will signifi-
cantly diminish the opportunity for state application of filial support
laws. However, there will still remain some opportunity for use of these
statutes.
SSI provides only for a national minimum level of assistance for the
aged. Consequently, over one-half of the states will supplement the
SSI payments. 26  These supplementary payments can be administered
by the federal government or by the state, at the state's option.27  Pres-
ently, sixteen states have chosen to administer their own supple-
mentary payments28 and hence are free to apply their filial support
laws. Additionally, the filial support laws will be applicable, still, to
other forms of state and local public assistance.
Considering its seventeenth century English origins and the Ameri-
can reverence for early English law, one might wonder whether the
longevity of these statutes may be attributed, in part, to their antiquity.
When filial support laws are viewed in the context of other provisions
of the early poor laws-settlement and removal, poorhouses, whipping,
22. See note 15 supra.
23. 42 U.S.C. §1381 etseq. (1974).
24. The OAA provisions were repealed by the enactment of SSI. Act of Oct. 30,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §303(a), 86 Stat. 1484.
25. Callison, Early Experience Under the Supplemental Security Income Program,
37 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3, 6 (June 1974).
26. See Rigby, State Supplementation Under Federal SSI Program, 37 Soc. S.Cu-
Rrr" BurL. 21 (Nov. 1974).
27. Id.
28. See for example California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 12001, which
provides that the state aid program for the support of the aged, blind, and disabled is
designed to supplement the federal social security program.
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maiming, and branding vagrants and beggars2 9 -and the stratified so-
ciety of Elizabethan England, it is easily concluded that these provisions
are more in harmony with the social and political theories of the seven-
teenth century than with modem American life. Other than the inertia
of their lengthy history, there would appear to be little basis for the
continued existence of filial support laws. Although speaking in an-
other context, Holmes might well have been referring to filial support
statutes when he stated,
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
it was laid down in the time of Henry VI. It is still more revolt-
ing if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past.30
FILIAL SUPPORT AND FAMILY STRucTURE
Evidence indicates that in eighteenth and nineteenth century Amer-
ica filial support laws were accepted by the public without incident."
Why does this seeming public acceptance appear to wane in the twen-
tieth century?32 A facile explanation would place the blame on declin-
ing values and a diminishment of family solidarity which existed in ear-
lier times. A much more adequate explanation is found if one looks
at the social and economic conditions which existed in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries and notes the effects of changes in these con-
ditions on the twentieth century family. In fact, one can easily con-
clude that the earliest Americans held strong beliefs which were anti-
thetical to the tenets of filial support, but social and economic condi-
tions postponed the conflict between these ideas and the concept of
filial support until twentieth century changes in these conditions forced
the conflict into the open.
By far the most significant change has been the shift from an agrarian
to an industrial society and its impact on family structure. Essentially,
this change has brought an end to the extended family in America and
has led to the isolation of the nuclear family.38 In our former agrarian
29. These violent aspects of the English Poor Law are discussed in tenDroek, supra
note 2, at 258-91.
30. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 H.Iv. L. Rtv. 457, 469 (1897).
31. 2 A. CAHouN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMIy 51-68 (1917).
32. Several factors support the inference that public support for federal support
laws has diminished. These factors include: (1) the gradual decline in the number of
states having filial support laws, see text accompanying note 18 supra; (2) the reluctance
on the part of district attorneys to prosecute violations of these laws, see text accom-
panying note 77 infra; and (3) the increasing incidence of constitutional attack on filial
support laws, see text accompanying notes 132-167 infra.
33. Parsons, The Aging in American Society, 27 LAw & CoNrMr,. PRon. 22
(1962).
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society the older person usually owned the family property and retained
economic power and control over the family, even after his productivity
had declined.3 4 Family, rather than individual, activities prevailed in
this rural world. The production of raw materials, the provision of
shelter, the processing of food products, the manufacturing of clothing,
and almost all other essential economic activities were carried on by
the family on a household basis. 35 As industrialization took place, the
prospect of factory employment freed young adults from direct de-
pendence on families.3 6 The resultant spatial and social mobility
tended to loosen family ties.37 In short, the shift from an agrarian to
an industrial society and the concomitant shift from a rural to an urban
population eroded the economic forces which had held the extended
family together. The nuclear family structure which resulted was less
able to provide many of the services performed in the past by the ex-
tended family.
38
Another highly relevant change that has occurred over the years is
the ever increasing numbers, both absolutely and relatively, of older
people in the American population. In 1900, there were approxi-
mately 3 million persons over 65 in America, and by 1970 there were
over 20 million in this group.39 This represents a six fold increase,
double the increase for the general population.4 9 In 1850 only 2.1
percent of the American population was over 65; 41 by 1900 this figure
had risen to 4.1 percent.4 1 Today, 'those over 65 represent 9.8 percent
of the population of the United States,43 and it is estimated that the
figure will reach 11.1 percent by the year 2000. 44  In fact, this esti-
mated figure may be significantly higher if the marked birth rate de-
cline which began in 1958 continues.45
A combination of factors is responsible for the changing structure
34. 2 INDUSrEiAL RELATIONS REsEARcH ASsoCIATION, THE AGED AND SOCIETY 48
(1950). In view of the common tendency to idyllize the rural American family, it is
worthwhile to note in passing that in the "old days" family relations were often based
on tyranny rather than affection, and the power and influence of older people were not
always cheerfully accepted by adult children. R. AT C Y, THE Socmi. FoRcEs IN
LATER Liu 13 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ATCHLEY].
35. ATCILEY, supra note 34, at 45.
36. G. LESLIE, THE FAMILY iN SocIAL CONTExT 213 (1973).
37. E. BURNS, SocAL SEcuRITY AN PUBLIC POLICY 84 (1956).
38. B. YORBURG, THE FururE OF Tim AMEmCAN FAMILY 194-95 (1973).
39. AT CHLEY, supra note 34, at 9.
40. Id.
41. UNrTED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPMC YEARBOOK, Table 4 (1956).
42. Id.
43. UNrrED STATEs BUREAU OF Tm CENSUS, PROJrCIoNS OF POPULATION OF THE
UNrrE. STATES, BY AGE AND SEx: 1970-2020, QRRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series
P-25, No. 470 (1971).
44. Id.
45. ATcILEY, supra note 34, at 10.
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of the American population. The primary reason for the aging of the
population is the decline in birth -rates that accompanied industrializa-
•tion. 46 The increasing life expectancy of American citizens, although
of lesser importance than the birth rate decline,47 is also a significant
contributing factor to the growth of an older population. In 1900 the
life expectancy of a person born in the United States was only 49
years; 48 by 1965, the figure was 70 years.4" This significant lengthen-
ing of life expectancy can be attributed to the large decrease in infant
and child mortality and the reduction in the death rate from com-
municable and other diseases of early and middle adulthood.50
A third factor which has had some recent significance in the United
States is migration. Generally, the effects of migration on the aging
of the population are relatively unimportant when compared with the
effects of declining birth rates and mortality."1 However, large num-
bers of young people who migrated to the United States in the early
twentieth century have contributed to the aging of the population in
the last several decades.52
Whatever the causes, there is no doubt that the number of older peo-
ple, both absolutely and relatively, has increased significantly in the last
two centuries. The impact of this increase on the application of filial
support laws is obvious. When the numbers and percentage of older
people in society were minimal, there was little occasion to test the
willingness or ability of children to support their parents. As more and
more of the population became faced with the problem of supporting
an older member of the family, the concept of filial support came under
closer scrutiny.
There are several less important changes which have contributed to
a diminishing acceptance of filial support laws in America. One of
these is the decreasing size of families.53 An old German proverb
states that one father takes better care of ten children than ten children
take care of one father. As the number of children in families de-
creases, each child's proportionate share of the financial burden of car-
ing for a needy parent is increased, leading to an increasing inability
46. H. WmxmsKY & C. LEBEAUX, INDUShUAL SociETY AND SocAL WELFARE 78
(1958).
47. AG NG xN WEsTERN Socmr=s 29 (E. Burgess ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as
Burgess].
48. ATCHLmEY, supra note 34, at 10.
49. Id.
50. Burgess, supra note 47, at 14.
51. Id. at 30.
52. ATCHLBY, supra note 34, at 9.
53. In 1910, the average family contained 4.5 children, in 1960, only 2.5 children.
ATCiEY, supra note 34, at 309.
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or reluctance to carry out this responsibility. Another contributing fac-
tor is the trend toward early marriage.5 4  Because of earlier marriage,
children leave the family home long before their parents are old and
in need of help. After years of being free from any necessity to sup-
port their parents, they will often be psychologically unready to accept
such responsibility, even though they might have readily accepted it had
there not been a long period of freedom.55
Another factor worthy of mention is the declining importance of
religion in America.-6 With respect to children, religious affiliation
has been shown to be an important determinant in attitudes toward
parental support.57 Although its impact is uncertain, the decline in
religious affiliation has likely contributed to the changed attitudes of
children toward filial support. Additionally, the church has tradi-
tionally felt a responsibility toward its older members.58 The older
person's religion helped him in a practical as well as spiritual way.
With the declining role of the church, fewer elderly have this support
available to them.
Finally, the replacement of an earlier societal misconception of the
problems of the poor aged with a growing understanding and sympathy
for these problems of the elderly have led to a more concerned societal
attitude. Well into the twentieth century the idea existed that the
problem of poverty in old age was primarily the result of ill-spent years,
ill-spent earnings, or ill-spent savings. 59 However, recognition of the
societal causes of poverty of the aged and the lack of control so many
of the elderly have over their circumstances is becoming more preva-
lent.60  As this realization grows, there is less reluctance to provide for
the support of the elderly out of the public purse.
Despite the waning public acceptance of filial support laws, 61 they
54. F. BOND, R. BABER, J. VImG, L. PERRY, A. SCAFF & L. LEE, OuR NEEDY AGD
296 (1954) [hereinafter cited as BOND].
55. Id.
56. In 1973, for example, only three of the fourteen largest christian churches in
America reported increased membership; Roman Catholics, Southern Baptists, and Mor-
mons. Major denominations reporting decreased membership included the United Meth-
odist Church, the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, the Episcopal Church, the Lutheran
Church in America, the United Presbyterian Church, the United Church of Christ, and
the American Lutheran Church. Further, statistics indicated a continuing decline in the
percentage of the population actually attending church services. 1974 BRrrANNiCA BOOK
OF THE YEAR 585.
57. Dinkel, Attitudes of Children Toward Supporting Aged Parents, 9 AM. Socio.
RPv. 370, 372 (1944).
58. M. FIELD, THE AGED, THE FAMILY, AND THE COMMUNITY 14 (1972).
59. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTIONS
229 (1908).
60. M. FIELD, THm AGED, Tm FAMILY, AND THE COMMUNrTy 15 (1972).
61. See note 32 supra.
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have, of course, continued to exist. The perpetuation of these laws
is due in significant part to the historical lack of a cohesive political
bloc to oppose the laws. The two groups which would oppose the im-
position of these statutes are the old and their children, usually -tied
together by the common bond of poverty. In his book on American
Legal History, Professor Lawrence M. Friedman, commenting on the
nineteenth century, stated that
[t]he basis of politics, and law, was the pressure of interest groups;
the loudest, most powerful voices won the most. Old people,
transients, the feebleminded, dirt-poor and crippled families-all
these stayed at the bottom of the social pit. Tort law blossomed,
corporation law swelled in pride; the poor laws were local, hap-
hazard, backward, and cruel.6
2
Although there has been an ever increasing awareness of the plight
of the poor and the aged, and a continuing effort to humanize the laws
relating to these groups, lack of an effective interest group certainly
contributes even today to the perpetuation of filial support laws.
It seems obvious that the cohesiveness and homogeneity necessary
to form an effective interest group do not exist with respect to children
who are liable for parental support. This lack of political power was
a point of judicial concern in a recent California case upholding the
legal duty of children to contribute to the support of their parents."3
Commenting on the possible abuse of majoritarian power, a dissenting
justice stated that "[the state may be unfairly shifting the burden of
public expenses onto a small segment of the citizenry ... a small
minority. . . with no cohesive characteristics that would permit effec-
tive political representation. ' 4
The political power of older people is a more complex question. Al-
though studies have shown a higher degree of political participation as
a person ages,65 it has been concluded that the older person views
politics more as a means of personal fulfillment and less as a means
of attaining some political goal."6 With respect to the capability of the
elderly to form an effective political pressure group, it would seem that
their inability to deliver votes in a bloc would seriously impede any ef-
fort to become a viable interest group. Such capability is further les-
62. L. FtiEDM.N, A HISTORY OF AmERICAN LAw 428 (1973).
63. Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 516 P.2d 840, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136
(1973).
64. Id. at 518, 516 P.2d at 859-60, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56 (Tobriner & Mosk,
JJ., dissenting).
65. Glenn, Aging, Voting and Political Interest, 33 Ai. Socio. REV. 563 (1968).
66. Id. at 564.
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sened by the lack of a homogeneity of characteristics which is necessary
for the formation and continuance of an effective interest group. "An
effective interest group . . . should have more in common than just
age.... Lacking similarity beyond age (and perhaps the state of retire-
ment), the old age political movements were handicapped from their
very inception."
' ' 7
Despite the fact that older people lack effective interest groups, in
recent years much legislation favorable to their interests has been
passed. Political scientists have attributed this result to the fact that
although old age political organizations were not effective as pressure
groups, they were effective in making visible the plight of the elderly,
and subsequently their cause has been picked up by non-age-based
groups.18  Although the legislators are now more responsive to the
problems of the aged, there can be little doubt that lack of an effective
opposition group helped perpetuate the responsible relatives statutes,
and even today presents a formidable stumbling block to repeal of
these laws.
Viewing filial support laws in light of the economic and social con-
text of the last three centuries, one is led to the conclusion that the
perpetuation and acceptance of these laws, and the more recent discon-
tent with them, must be blamed primarily on social and economic con-
ditions and to a lesser extent on the former existence and subsequent
decline of certain beliefs and values which led to family solidarity. As
one commentator pointed out,69 two important ideas of the earliest
Americans were antithetical to the strictest concepts of filial responsi-
bility: (1) in a new world, men face the future and worship, not ances-
tors, but posterity; and (2) in an equalitarian atmosphere every per-
son is important unto himself. However, the conflict of these ethics
and the concepts of filial responsibility was postponed until the twen-
tieth century because family structure of early America was not inimical
to filial support laws. It was not until economic and social changes
restructuxed the family that the conflict became apparent.
THE ECONOMICS OF FILIAL SUPPORT LAWS
Since the primary justification for application of filial support laws
is the protection of the public purse, 0 it is important to consider the
67. Carlie, The Politics of Age: Interest Group or Social Movement?, 9 THE
GEnoNToLoGIsr 259, 263 (1969).
68. ATrcmEY, supra note 34, at 247.
69. ScHoRR, supra note 20, at 2-3.
70. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
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economic benefits obtained from the application of such laws. Such
an analysis must take into account two ways in which a state's public
assistance outlays may be lessened by filial support laws. The first
means of public financial gain is the direct revenues produced by the
application of these laws, balanced against the administrative costs in-
volved in making these collections. The second form of financial
benefit is the indirect lessening of public assistance costs brought about
by the failure of many elderly people to apply for assistance due to
the inhibitory presence of these statutes.
With respect to the net revenues obtained from the enforcement of
filial support laws, evidence is scanty and contradictory. California,
which in recent years has raised support requirements and made a zeal-
ous effort to reduce welfare costs, 7'1 estimated that for the 1973-74 fis-
cal year $8,000,000 was collected under the Responsible Relatives Pro-
gram at an administrative cost of $2,500,000.72 Under the current re-
duced support requirements, 7 estimated revenues are $3,500,000 to
$5,000,000 annually, with no estimate given for administrative costs.74
These figures should be put into context by noting that total expendi-
tures for the California Old Age Assistance Program are in the vicinity
of $400,000,000.7
5
Several years ago, the Moreland Commission Report on welfare costs
in the state of New York estimated that $7,250,000 was recovered
from responsible relatives at an administrative cost of $1,250,000.7'
The Community Service Society of New York subsequently challenged
these figures as incorrect in its report on family responsibility and pub-
lic welfare, arguing that the income was over-estimated and the ad-
ministrative costs were underestimated.7 7  Federal studies found that
the cost of investigation of filial support in New Jersey represented
13.5 percent 78 and in New York 11.8 percent 9 of the total cost of ad-
71. See Beilenson & Agran, The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, 3 PAC. L.J. 475
(1972); Zumbrun, Momboisse & Findley, Welfare Reform: California Meets the Chal-
lenge, 4 PAc. L.J. 739 (1973).
72. Letter from John H. Sullivan, Assistant to the Director, Public Information,
Cal. Dep't of Benefit Payments, Nov. 14, 1974, on file at the Pacific Law Journal.
73. Although California substantially increased parental support requirements in
1971, CAL. STATs. 1971, c. 578, §33, at 1167, legislation enacted in 1973 returned Cal-
ifornia to the graduated income scale in effect prior to the 1971 amendment. See CAL.
WBLF. & INST. CODE §12351, as amended, CAL. STATs. 1973, c. 1216, at 2912.
74. Letter from John H. Sullivan, Assistant to the Director, Public Information,
Cal. Dep't of Benefit Payments, Nov. 14, 1974, on file at the Pacific Law Journal.
75. U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SOCIAL SEcURnT BULLE TN,
ANNUAL STATIStiCAL SUPPLEMENT 148 (1972).
76. Rosenbaum, Are Family Responsibility Laws Constitutional?, 1 FAM. L.Q. 55,
60 (Dec. 1967).
77. COMMUNrrY SERvICE SocmTY OF NEw YoRE, FA=sLAL REsPONSmILrrY AND
PuBLiC WELFARE 8 (1964).
78. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REGION II, ADMINISrI1ATIVn
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ministering the Old Age Assistance Program. Alvin Schorr, in a study
done for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, concluded
that "savings might be balanced by the cost of administration."8  In
a survey of California welfare administrators, two-thirds were of the
opinion that the relatives' responsibility laws of that state cost more to
administer than they actually brought in.81 Although the evidence is
scanty, it seems safe to conclude that net revenues, if any, produced
by the direct application of filial support statutes are not very substan-
tial. There seems to be little doubt that this small return can be traced
to the high administrative costs involved in the enforcement of the rela-
tive's obligation.
In the recent past many states avoided the difficult enforcement
problems connected with the filial support laws by the use of a simple,
if rather harsh scheme. If the state determined that a child was obli-
gated to contribute to his parent's support, this amount was deducted
from the public assistance payment to the parent whether the parent
received the child's contribution or not. 2 This tactic was premised on
the hope that the responsibile child would carry out his obligation
rather than see his needy parent starve. Fortunately, this drastic sanc-
tion is no longer used, but the administrative difficulties inherent in
the enforcement of filial support laws remain.
Several factors are responsible for the high costs involved in adminis-
tering the filial support laws. Many offspring of those applying for
public assistance are themselves at or near the poverty level.83  It fol-
lows that in many cases the cost of investigating an applicant's relatives
will lead to no offsetting revenues. The reluctance of the responsible
child to cooperate and of administrators to enforce the filial support
laws are additional stumbling blocks to the effective application of
these statutes. Because of the family tensions which are present in a
case in which support is compelled, many persons forced into payment
will either default or be kept current only at continued and expensive
public vigilance. 84  Additionally, in many cases a caseworker will feel
that requiring a child to contribute is unjust and neglect to press the
STUDY OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF INSTTUTIONS AND AGENCIES (1958).
79. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REGION II, ADMIImSTRATIVE
COST STUDY, STATE OF NEW YORK, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE (1959).
80. SCHORR, supra note 20, at 25.
81. BOND, supra note 54, at 136.
82. As recently as 1952, fourteen states required filial support and adjusted public
assistance payments even if the responsible child did not make the required payment.
SCHORR, supra note 20, at 24.
83. See text accompanying notes 119-126 infra.
84. UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK, STATEMENT OF RELA-
TIVE RESPONSIBmLTY (1951).
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matter.85 Even when the welfare agency turns a case over to the dis-
trict attorney, there may be a reluctance on his part to enforce this law.
Being an elected official, he has little desire to engage in the unpopular
practice of forcing people to support their aged relatives against their
will."8 A final administrative difficulty is the problem of out-of-state
responsible children. The filial support laws apply with equal force
to relatives within or outside the state, but because of the administra-
tive costs involved, out-of-state relatives are generally left undis-
turbed. 7 An additional question has been raised as to whether a state
which does not have a filial support statute might refuse to enforce
the filial support statute of another state since it could be viewed as viola-
tive of the positive policy of the forum. 88
By far the most important cost saving aspect of filial support laws
lies in their inhibitory effect on applications for public assistance. 80 In
states where filial support provisions have been repealed, there has
been a subsequent increase in the number of applicants for public as-
sistance. In states where filial support laws have been instituted or
revived, the result has been a substantial decrease in the public assis-
tance rolls.90 There seems to be little question that filial support laws
do dissuade large numbers of elderly persons from applying for public
assistance. To view these indirect savings as a positive effect of the
filial support laws is to embrace a contradiction with the very purpose
of providing public support. If it is in fact desirable to reduce the costs
of public support by deterring the use of the program, the logical goal
would be to deter the use of the program by all potential recipients--
to eliminate the program. It makes little sense to provide public sup-
port and to simultaneously discourage its use, and for this reason the
indirect savings cannot reasonably be viewed as a justification of the
filial support laws.91
SociAL COSTS OF FILIAL SUPPORT LAWS
To determine the desirability of the application of filial support laws,
one must necessarily look, in addition to the economic costs and bene-
fits, to the social costs and benefits. The issues that must be examined
85. Scnom, supra note 20, at 24.
86. BOND, supra note 54, at 200.
87. Rosenbaum, Are Family Responsibility Laws Constitutional?, I FAM. L.Q. 55,
62 (Dec. 1967).
88. Id.
89. J. DRAKE, THE AGED IN A, xmcAN SocEnTiy 180 (1958); 1 WIscoNs N LEoMS-
LATIVE CoUNcm, PROBLEMS OF THm AGED pt. 2, at 44 (1953).
90. Stevens & Springer, Maine Revives Responsibility of Relatives, 6 Puir. WELF,.
122 (1948); ScsoRA, supra note 20, at 26.
91. See text accompanying notes 127-133 infra.
1975 / Filial Support
in this regard are the effects of filial support laws on family relation-
ships and the individuals concerned, and the contention that filial sup-
port laws aid in the perpetuation of poverty.
A. The Effect of Filial Support Laws on the Family
No doubt the most critical issue involved in the question of applica-
tion of the filial support laws, and the most controversial, is the effect
of such laws on intrafamily relationships. Opinions on this issue run
the gamut from the view that such laws are highly destructive of family
relationships to -the view that they are supportive of such relationships.
In addition to the effect on the family relationships, the effect on those
involved must also be examined.
The person most vulnerable in this situation is the parent. Although
there might be disagreement about the effect of filial support laws,
there is little disagreement about the physical, social, and psychological
problems that accompany the aging process. Both the physical9" and
the mental health93 of the older person deteriorate rapidly. As a group
the elderly show a greater occurrence of chronic illnesses, 94 physical
impairment, and disability than the general population.9 5 Old age is
also accompanied by a decline in the sensory processes, psychomotor
performance, and mental functioning generally.96 Additionally, the in-
cidence of psychosis is far greater in older people,97 as is suicideY8 So-
ciologists have noted that the social and economic changes that have
occurred in recent years have fallen with greatest force on the older
person99 and have imprisoned him in a "roleless role' 100 and tainted
him with the "stigma" of old age.' 10
An ever present fear of older people is the fear of dependence, of
becoming a burden to others. This phobia exists in the minds of the
elderly because entailed in becoming a burden is the threat of social
rejection and loss of self-respect." 2 The socialization process in Amer-
ica teaches one to admire and strive for independence; dependence is
disfavored. 103 The older person who becomes dependent must not
92. See generally Burgess, supra note 47, at 156-202.
93. Id. at 203-70.
94. ATCHmEY, supra note 34, at 114-16.
95. Id. at 121-23.
96. Id. at 51-72.
97. 1 M. RILEY & A. FoNa, AGING mD SociETY 370 (1968).
98. Id. at 393.
99. Burgess, supra note 47, at 17.
100. Id. at 20.
101. ATCHLEY, supra note 34, at 14.
102. PROBLEMS OF THm AGED 208 (C. Vedder & A. Lefkowitz eds. 1965).
103. ATcmmY, supra note 34, at 190-91.
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only cope with society's disapproval but also with his own fear and dis-
approval of the dependent role.104
If an older person is unable to maintain financial independence, he
must either seek support from the state, or if a filial support statute
exists, first turn to his children for assistance. At first glance one might
see little difference since in either case he is not independent. How-
ever, upon closer scrutiny important differences are apparent. First,
there is a growing acceptance of the notions that the receipt of socially
provided income involves no stigma,105 and that the aging parent should
accept an old-age pension rather than claim support from adult chil-
dren.' 0 Public assistance is viewed more as a right than as charity,
and acceptance does not create the same feelings of dependence in the
older person. More importantly, though, detrimental collateral effects
on the family are present when economic support is required from off-
spring that are not present when the support flows from the state.
When an older person is financially dependent on his children, a
great strain is put on their relationship. Both the parent and the child
resent the dependence, both feel guilt as a result of this resentment,
and both tend to become hostile toward the source of their guilt.'
07
This kind of relationship is a vicious circle of resentment, guilt, and
hostility that tends to grow increasingly worse-often to the point of
breakdown of the relationship between parent and child.' 08 Filial sup-
port laws also have a tendency to make the poor or near-poor live to-
gether rather than establish independent households. This results
when the children are unable to discharge their support requirement
in cash and instead satisfy it by furnishing room and board to their
parent.' -0 9 This situation can lead to an even greater feeling of de-
pendency on the part of the parent whose presence is tolerated rather
than welcomed. Many psychologists have noted the crisis of authority
between a parent and his young child, but as one commentator pointed
out, "[t]his crisis may be a mere shadow in comparison to the authority
crisis an older person goes through if he must become dependent on
his child.""'
104. Kalish, Of Children and Grandfathers: A Speculative Essay on Dependency, 7
THE GERONTOLOGIST 65 (1967).
105. E. BURNS, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 85 (1956).
106. H. WILEN KY & C. LEBEAUX, INDUSTLL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL WELFARE 178
(1958).
107. ATCHLEY, supra note 34, at 195.
108. Id. at 195-96.
109. Rosenbaum, Are Family Responsibility Laws Constitutional?, 1 FAm. L.Q. 55,
66 (Dec. 1967).
110. ATCHLEY, supra note 34, at 195.
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From the child's perspective different problems exist. Forcing a
child to forego an advanced education, to curtail spending for his own
family, or in the case of an older child, to inhibit preparation for his
own retirement, is bound to foster resentment on the part of the child
and possible guilt on the part of the parent. This situation is further
aggravated for the child who has never been close to his parent, yet
is expected to contribute to his support. Although a few states which
have filial support statutes exempt from liability those offspring who
were abandoned during their childhood,"1 most do not. Additionally,
psychologists have maintained that the demand for support may raise
serious problems for the liable child since it symbolizes to him the per-
sonal inadequacy of his needy parent."
1 2
Older people generally, and to a greater extent those receiving pub-
lic assistance, are opposed to a legal requirement compelling filial sup-
port. A survey of older Californians showed that only 36 percent fa-
vored a law requiring children to contribute to the support of their
parents, and only 29 percent of those receiving public assistance fa-
vored such a law."13  In 1961 the White House Conference on Aging
concluded that
laws and practices which enforce or assume support from adult
children, and in many places with little or no regard for the needs
and responsibilities of adult children and their young, weaken
family relationships and family responsibility, and are destructive
to older persons and the families of their adult children. Such re-
quirements should be removed from State laws and practice." 4
Those who favor retention of filial support laws speak of "strength-
ening family bonds," 5 the "obvious fairness"" 6 of such a require-
ment, or the "moral responsibility" 1 7 involved. Yet logically and fac-
tually the filial support laws can be seen to create and increase family
dissension and to destroy family ties at the very time and in the very
111. For example, California's statute provides that an adult child may seek a decree
releasing him from obligations of parental support if such child alleges that he was aban-
doned by his parent for a period of two or more years prior to attaining the age of 18
years. The section further provides that if these allegations are determined to be true,
a decree shall issue releasing such child from all parental support obligations imposed
by state law. CAL. CIv. CODE §206.5. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §17-320
(1974); ORE. REV. SrAT. §416.030(2) (c) (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62 §1973 (1968).
112. Towle, Common Human Needs in Public Assistance Programs, 18 Soc. SERv.
REv. 469, 473 (1944).
113. BOND, supra note 54, at 320.
114. REPORT OF THE WHITE HousE CoNFnm NcE ON AGING, THE NATION AND ITS
OLDER PEOPLE 173 (1961).
115. BOND, supra note 54, at 353.
116. 4 C. VERNIER, AMmucAN FAMILY LAWS, Parent and Child 95 (1936).
117. 1 WIscoNSIN LEGImS TVE COuNcm, PROBLEMS OF THE AGED pt. 2, at 44
(1953).
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circumstances they are needed most.118 There is indeed no "obvious
fairness" in filial support laws.
B. The Perpetuation of Poverty
A further argument that can be raised against the application of filial
support laws is that their effect is to perpetuate poverty. Although the
immediate victims of such a perpetuation are those required to con-
tribute and their families, the ultimate victim is society as a whole.
The imposition of liability, in many cases, actively interferes with what-
ever potentialities for self-advancement "responsible" children may have
and helps to assure poverty for generations to come.
Some feel that the purpose of filial support statutes is to "catch" well-
to-do children who are shirking their responsibility to support their
parents and shifting this burden to the public.1 9 However, scholars, 20
social workers,"' experts in the field of public welfare,
122 and judges128
have taken a contrary position, finding instead that
[t]he enforcement of the 'duty to support' is not an attempt to
make the well-to-do support their poor relatives, but an order re-
quiring those who have very little to help their relatives who have
less, and who frequently have nothing at all.12 4
Forcing an older responsible child to contribute to the support of his
parents, foregoing his own economic security when looking toward an
impending retirement, or asking a younger child to support a parent
rather than pursue an advanced education, 25 only shifts economic
desolation from one generation to the next. Disregarding for the
moment the human costs involved in the application of filial support
laws and looking to the policy goals of the poor and welfare laws and
the economic ramifications involved, one must conclude that the filial
118. tenBroek, Californias Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development,
and Present Status, 17 STA N. L. REv. 614, 645-46 (1964); see, e.g., B. YoRBauo, THE
Futurn oF THE AMmuCAN FAMILY (1973); Abbott, Abolish the Pauper Laws, 8 Soc.
Strm. Rnv. 1 (1934); Dinkel, Attitudes of Children Toward Supporting Aged Parents,
9 Am. Socio. REv. 370 (1944); Hitrovo, Responsibility of Relatives in the Old-Age As-
sistance Program in Pennsylvania, 18 Soc. SERv. REy. 67 (1944). In a survey of older
people with modest financial means, the elderly ranked filial affection as most important
to them while material help was a distant second. Rosenbaum, Are Family Responsibil-
ity Laws Constitutional?, 1 FAM. L.Q. 55, 68 (Dec. 1967).
119. BoNn, supra note 54, at 320.
120. Hitrovo, Responsibility of Relatives in the Old-Age Assistance Program In
Pennsylvania, 18 Soc. Saitv. R v. 67 (1944).
121. 0. POLLAx, SocIL A.rUTs-mENr IN OLD AoE, Bull. No. 59 (Published by the
Social Science Research Council, N.Y.) (1948).
122. 1 E. ABBoTr, PuBLIC Assis-rAcE 164 (1940).
123. Carleson v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 1068, 100 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1972).
124. 1 E. ABBOrTr, PuBLIC ASSISTANcE 164 (1940).
125. Children of indigent parents may be required to forego advanced education by
reason of their obligation to support their parents. Ors. Arr'VY GEN. 292 (Vt. 1940).
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support laws are ill suited to the goals. The overriding governmental
concern is to eradicate poverty. Yet, if in fact the filial support laws
make it more likely that succeeding generations of persons will be
forced into poverty, the folly of such laws is apparent. Any short-run
economic gains are more than offset by the long-run costs generated
by these laws. If the poor of today are most likely to become the poor
of tomorrow, positive social intervention is needed to break the cycle
of hopelessness that links one generation to the next. 26
A related aspect of this problem results from the unwillingness of
many parents to apply for public assistance at all, even if this means
a substandard existence. Legislators and administrators acknowledge
that one of the important reasons for the application of filial support
laws is that they act "to keep aged persons from applying for assistance
or result in the denial or withdrawal of their applications,"'12 7 and this
constitutes "one of the most effective means for preventing an assist-
ance program from becoming so large as to place an impossible burden
upon the financial resources of the community.' 28 The effect of these
statutes is to inhibit applications for public assistance. This effect has
been illustrated by large increases in caseloads in states which have
repealed responsible relatives provisions. 29 The important point is
that many fail to apply because they genuinely do not wish to deprive
their children, or they hesitate to risk their anger.'3 0  These parents
continue to exist on less than a public assistance budget.' 3 ' The mag-
nitude of this reluctance to apply has been evidenced by the experience
of Maine. In 1948 Maine revived its responsible relatives statutes, re-
quiring all children of those receiving public assistance to submit de-
tailed financial data. Although over 2,000 cases were closed as a result
of this action, 40 percent of those cases were closed because of a failure
to submit financial statements. 32 The continuation of filial support
laws should not be at the expense of the older person who refuses to
apply, thus protecting his children but denying himself a decent stand-
ard of living.
Filial support laws must be considered in relation to poverty.
Granted that this type of law might be only one of many handicaps
126. Orshansky, Children of the Poor, 26 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3, 12 (June 1963).
127. 1 WISCONSIN LEGISLATIW COUNCm, PROBLEMS OF THE AoE pt. 2, at 44
(1953).
128. Id. pt. 1, at 8.
129. J. DAK, Tim AGED iN Ammcwc SOCmTY 180 (1958).
130. SCHORR, supra note 20, at 29.
131. Id.
132. Stevens & Springer, Maine Revives Responsibility of Relatives, 6 PuB. WELF.
122 (1948).
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that surround a poor family, it may, on occasion, be the crucial one,
the one that persuades a person that improvement for him is not des-
tined to be.
We have had the vision from time to time of so organizing public
welfare, and our society, that we shall wipe out poverty as we know
it today. Eliminating the support requirement in public assistance
is only one element in this program, but it is an element.183
LEGAL CHALLENGES TO FILIAL SUPPORT LAWS
There has not been a great deal of appellate litigation challenging
filial support statutes. One possible explanation, discussed earlier, is
the reluctance of district attorneys to prosecute these cases.' 8 4 An-
other explanation which has been proferred is that the persons against
whom such actions are brought are often too poor to carry an appeal
to a higher court in case of an adverse decision in the lower courts.180
Probably the most likely explanation is the singular lack of success of
the challenges that were made.
In the earlier cases that were appealed, a variety of constitutional
arguments were made. These included arguments that the filial sup-
port laws violated due process, 8 6 were a form of double taxation,'
7
constituted a taking without just compensation,18 and violated the
supremacy clause. 89 None of these challenges were successful. Most
recently filial support statutes have been subjected to the argument that
the imposition of liability pursuant to such statutes is violative of the
equal protection clause.
The most exhaustive litigation of filial support laws has taken place
in California courts. Because of the continuity of that examination and
the scarcity of cases in other jurisdictions, the balance of this section
will analyze recent California decisions in which the constitutionality
of filial support laws has been challenged.
The first case to suggest that the California Supreme Court might
find filial support laws violative of the equal protection clause was
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley.' In this case the state
133. COMMUNiTy SERVICE SocIETY OF NEw YoRK, FAmmy RESPONSIBILrIY AND
PUBLIC WELFARE 122 (1964).
134. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
135. Rosenbaum, Are Family Responsibility Laws Constitutional?, 1 FAM. L.Q. 55,
61 (Dec. 1967).
136. Mallatt v. Luihn, 206 Ore. 678, 294 P.2d 871 (1956).
137. State Comm'n in Lunacy v. Eldridge, 7 Cal. App. 298, 94 P. 597 (1908).
138. Department of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery, 50 Cal. 2d 742, 329 P.2d 689
(1958).
139. Maricopa County v. Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35, 208 P.2d 646 (1949).
140. 59 Cal. 2d 247, 379 P.2d 22, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1963).
1975 / Filial Support
sought payment of the costs of confinement in a state mental institution
from the son of a person who was committed after being adjudged in-
sane and unable to stand trial for the murder of his wife. This pay-
ment was sought pursuant to a statute which made certain relatives of
inmates of state mental institutions responsible for the costs of their
care. The court held that the requirement that the son pay these costs
was a denial of equal protection. Because of the criminal nature of
the underlying proceedings, it was thought that the decision would have
little practical effect on the broader question of the constitutionality of
relatives responsibility statutes in general.
A year later, however, the court applied Hawley in Department of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner,141 a decision that was to serve as the
springboard for future attacks on the responsible relatives statutes.
The facts of Kirchner were essentially the same as Hawley except that
in this case the commitment to the state mental institution was the re-
sult of civil rather than criminal proceedings. The court, however,
found this distinction to be of no legal significance and found that the
liability sought to be enforced in Kirchner was subject to the same con-
stitutional infirmity as was found in Hawley. 4 ' Additionally, the court
intimated that the use of responsible relatives statutes in other contexts
might be subject to the same challenge.
The equal protection analysis undertaken by the court in Kirchner
and Hawley is not well articulated and seems faulty in several respects.
The court reasoned that the "enactment and administration of laws pro-
viding for sequestration and treatment of persons in appropriate state
institutions ... is a proper state function... [and] that the expense
of providing, operating and maintaining such institutions should . . .
be borne by the state."' 43  Based on this assessment the court leap-
frogged to the conclusion that a statute which charged any class of indi-
viduals with the cost of maintaining such institutions, excepting perhaps
a charge to the inmate himself, was arbitrary and violative of the equal
protection clause.1
44
Modem judicial analysis of an equal protection question first defines
the purpose of the statute under attack, then defines the classification
established by the statute, and finally attempts to determine whether
there is a reasonable relation between the purpose and the classifica-
141. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964).
142. Id. at 720, 388 P.2d at 722-23, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
143. Id. at 719-20, 388 P.2d at 722, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
144. Id. at 720, 388 P.2d at 722, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
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tion. 145  In Kirchner and Hawley the court found the purpose of the
statute invalid-no law could impose private liability for support of
mental patients in state institutions-and in so doing applied the equal
protection analysis which prevailed in the early part of the century but
which has long since been discarded. This is evidenced by reliance
in Hawley on Coppage v. Kansas4 ' and Smith v. Texas, 47 which were
founded on the doctrinal concept that the court may find the equal pro-
tection clause violated when it believes that the statute in question
represents an unwise expression of debatable social policy.' 48
An inconsistency in the Hawley and Kirchner reasoning is found in
the court's apparent willingness to except from its broad sweep a statute
aimed at obtaining costs of care in a state institution from the inmate
himself. Although implicit in the court's reasoning is the notion that
a proper state function is necessary an exclusive state function,1 49 it has
carved this exception. Yet if this exception is to be allowed, it should
be explained why another exception cannot be allowed. This un-
answered question lies at the heart of the equal protection analysis
which the court skirted in its opinion. 50 So it seems that the court
in Kirchner and Hawley was misguided in its doctrinal approach as well
as inconsistent in the approach it did use.
Despite the broad terms in which the Kirchner decision was written,
the lower appellate courts in California subsequently limited Kirchner's
application to its particular factual situation.' 5' In challenges to other
statutes which imposed some type of liability on certain relatives, these
courts held that three factors must be present before the statute under
attack will be struck down: (1) the person sought to be charged must
not be liable for reasons other than the given statute (no preexisting
duty); (2) the state must have initiated the proceedings for which re-
covery is sought; and (3) the expenditure in question must be pri-
marily for the benefit of the public.' 2
145. Comment, Compulsory Contribution to Support of State Mental Patients Held
Deprivation of Equal Protection, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 858, 862 (1964).
146. 236 U.S. 1 (1914).
147. 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
148. "The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like
cases-that due process [or equal protection] authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitu-
tional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been dis-
carded." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
149. Comment, Compulsory Contribution to Support of State Mental Patients Held
Deprivation of Equal Protection, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 858, 859 (1964).
150. Id. at 863.
151. For a discussion of Kirchner and subsequent decisions, see Tully, Family Re-
sponsibility Laws: An Unwise and Unconstitutional Imposition, 5 FAM. L.Q. 32
(1971); Comment, Pennsylvania's Family Responsibility Statute-Corruption of Blood
and Denial of Equal Protection, 77 Dicr. L. REv. 331, 339 (1972); Note, Relative's Sup-
port Liability: Two Years After Kirchner, 18 HAST. L.J. 720 (1967).
152. Department of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor, 246 Cal. App. 2d 24, 54 Cal.
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Looking to the language of Kirchner, it is easy to see how the deci-
sion could be used to attack filial support laws as they are applied to
the children of those receiving old age assistance. Care of the poor
aged is a proper state function; hence it is arbitrary to charge any class
of individuals with the cost of this care. Filial support statutes do just
this and are therefore violative of the equal protection clause.1 3  In
1971 the defendant in County of San Mateo v. Boss'" presented this
very argument to the California Supreme Court.
In Boss the County of San Mateo was seeking to collect from the
defendant unpaid monthly contributions toward the support of his
mother, who was receiving public assistance, as well as an order requir-
ing defendant to make such monthly contributions in the future. In its
opinion the court reaffirmed the viability of Kirchner and expanded the
limited application which the lower courts had attributed to it. It spe-
cifically rejected the limitation that the aid in question must primarily
benefit the public' 55 and implicitly rejected the limitation based on
whether the state or the individual initiated the proceedings for which
the defendant was sought to be charged. The court did, however, af-
firm that a responsible relative could, consistent with equal protection,
be made liable if he had a preexisting duty to support the person in
question.' 58  The court said that this preexisting duty could be present
if a similar duty was found at common law, but concluded that this was
not the case here since at common law there was no liability on a child
to support his parents.lsr Although intimating that it might refuse to
find that the California responsible relatives statute58 entails a rational
classification as to those who are required to pay a larger portion of
the expense of providing welfare assistance, 5 9 the court expressly
declined to decide this issue.' 0  Instead the court was able to reach
a decision based on the facts of the case and construction of the stat-
utes involved.
Under California law public assistance was granted to one who was
Rptr. 432 (1966); County of Alameda v. Espinoza, 243-Cal. App. 2d 534, 52 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1966); In re Dudley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 401, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1966); County
of Alameda v. Kaiser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 815, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1966).
153. See Comment, Compulsory Contribution to Support of State Mental Patients
Held Deprivation of Equal Protection, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 858, 865 (1964); 77 HARv.
L. REv. 1523, 1525 (1964).
154. 3 Cal. 3d 962, 479 P.2d 654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1971).
155. Id. at 968-69, 479 P.2d at 658, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
156. Id. at 971, 479 P.2d at 659-60, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
157. Id. at 971, 479 P.2d at 659, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
158. CAL. Crv. Con §206.
159. 3 Cal. 3d at 971 n.8, 479 P.2d at 660 n.8, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 300 n.8.
160. Id.
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"in need," yet filial support was only required if a person was "poor."1 1
In this case, although defendant's mother owned a $31,800 home, she
was deemed "in need" for purposes of public assistance, but the court
determined that she was not "poor" for purposes of the filial support
statute, and hence liability could not be imposed on the defendant.
10 2
The precise issue of the constitutionality of filial support laws was not
to be decided until three years later in Swoap v. Superior Court.08
In 1971 a class action was filed in the Superior Court of Sacramento
County by plaintiffs representing two classes-elderly persons receiv-
ing public assistance who have children liable under the state's respon-
sible relatives statute -and the children of such parents. The Depart-
ment of Social Welfare and its Director were defendants. The superior
court issued a statewide restraining order enjoining defendants from
enforcing the filial support laws of the state. Defendants appealed,
seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the court from enforcing its
restraining order. Since the loophole which was the basis for the Boss
decision had been closed by the state legislature, 10 4 the question
squarely facing the court was whether the statute requiring filial sup-
port from children whose parents are receiving public assistance is con-
stitutional.
In Sivoap the supreme court rejected the analysis it had used in
Kirchner and Boss and, using accepted equal protection analysis, con-
cluded that the filial support statute in question was not violative of
the equal protection clause. In reaching this conclusion the court
found that the classification in question was rational in that the parents
who are now in need supported and cared for their children during the
latter's minority and "[s]ince these children received special benefits
from the class of 'parents in need', it is entirely rational that the chil-
dren bear a special burden with respect to that class."105
Additionally, the court disposed of an argument by the plaintiffs that
stricter scrutiny must be used by the court in examining this statute
since it creates a "suspect" classification. This argument was advanced
on two separate theories: (1) the classification distinguished between
people on the basis of wealth; and (2) the classification distinguished
between people on the basis of ancestry.
With respect to the argument that the classification was based on
161. Id. at 970-71, 479 P.2d at 659, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
162. Id.
163. 10 Cal. 3d 490, 516 P.2d 840, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1973).
164. CAL. SrATs. 1971, c. 578, §3, at 1137.
165. 10 Cal. 3d at 506, 516 P.2d at851, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
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wealth, the court found that although such an argument had surface
plausibility, closer examination exposed the argument as "pure sophis-
try."' 66  Regarding the class of "parents in need," the state interest
advanced, minimization of the cost of public assistance, only comes into
play when the needy are involved. However, insofar as the state acts
toward this class of people it is conferring a benefit upon them, either
by direct aid or by providing them with a remedy to secure support
from their adult children.'6 7 With respect to the correlative duty im-
posed on the adult children of the "parents in need," the classification
is not based on wealth, but on parentage.16
The court went on to find that ancestry is not a suspect classification.
Plaintiffs contended that Hirabayashi v. United States69 was supportive
of the principle that a classification based on ancestry was suspect.
The California court pointed out that a later Supreme Court case
70
made clear that ancestry, when used in Hirabayashi, denoted racial
classification and not parentage.1
71
It seems clear that Swoap substantially overruled Kirchner and its
progeny Boss. At the same time it seems clear that the prior decisions
were the result of faulty equal protection analysis and that the Swoap
decision represents presently accepted judicial analysis of equal protec-
tion questions. Although some might argue that filial support laws are
indeed violative of equal protection, 72 it seems their analysis is heavily
swayed by their dislike for the underlying social consequences. The
majority opinion was "not unmindful that these provisions may involve
harsh results in certain instances,"' 73 but recognized that "the ameliora-
tion of any harsh results must rest in the hands of the administering
authorities, since these provisions are constitutional."'174
CONCLUSION
On balance there seems to be little to recommend the use of filial
support statutes, other than the fact that they are constitutional under
166. Id. at 505, 516 P.2d at 850, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
170. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633' (1948).
171. Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 507, 516 P.2d 840, 851, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 136, 147 (1973).
172. See id. at 511, 516 P.2d at 854, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (Tobriner & Mosk, JJ.,
dissenting); Tully, Family Responsibility Laws: An Unwise and Unconstitutional Im-
position, 5 FAM. L.Q. 32 (1971); Note, Equal Protection-Relative's Responsibility Stat-
utes Do Not Create a "Suspect" Classification Based on Wealth, 2 FoRDHAM URBAN L.J.
587 (1973).
173. 10 Cal. 3d at 507, 516 P.2d at 852, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
174. Id. at 507-08, 516 P.2d at 852, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 6
present standards of judicial analysis. Historically they arose as part
of a pervasive statutory scheme which was designed not to solve the
causes and problems of the poor, but to minimize the cost to the public
of maintaining the destitute. Although such statutes have a long
history in America, much of this longevity can be attributed to social
and economic conditions and not to public acceptance of these laws.
Their impact on familial relations and family members, particularly the
elderly, can be devastating. Although some economic gains can be at-
tributed to the existence of these statutes, such gains are, to some
extent at the expense of needy elderly who are unwilling to apply for
assistance because of the desire to protect their children from what they
feel to be an unwarranted burden.
In light of the historical context in which filial support laws came
into being, their detrimental effect on the family, and the source of
their economic savings, this writer suggests that state legislatures re-
peal all such statutes and that in the future both state and federal gov-
erning bodies refrain from using this device as a method of trying to
reduce ever rising welfare costs. These recommendations do not imply
a disagreement with the moral underpinnings of such statutes but
simply a recognition of the difficulties of prescribing moral standards
through usage of the legal process.
A final point worthy of mention concerns the problems of the elderly
in our society. The manner in which a state cares for its elderly is
an important measure of its civilization. In recent times there has
been much to indicate that the elderly in America are not cared for
in a manner which reflects a concerned society. The maintenance and
imposition of filial support laws is certainly not as serious a manifesta-
tion of societal neglect and disregard of the aged as are other abuses
to which the elderly are subjected. Yet the filial support laws do con-
tribute to the disturbing plight of the elderly in America, and unlike
many other problems of the aged, this problem is easily remedied with
little, if any, cost.
Admittedly, the social costs of filial support are difficult to quantify,
but their impact cannot be denied or ignored. Admitting the difficulty
of measurement, perhaps the best indication of the social impact of
these laws can be found by listening to those who are most affected
by them. It seems apt to conclude with a most eloquent statement by
an elderly Californian, obviously deeply distressed by the filial support
laws:
No one is born into this world with a debt to their parents for their
birth and contributions until their maturity. That is the parent's
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contribution to life and society. When the child reaches maturity,
he starts a new separate unit and in turn makes his contribution to
life and society as did his parents, carrying on the generation cycle
on through eternity. The children should not be saddled with un-
just demands that keep them at or near the poverty level with no
hope to escape it, just because a parent still breathes. And aged
parents should not have to live their remaining lives facing the
heartbreaking experience of being such a burden to their children.
Many would prefer death but are afraid of retribution for taking
their own lives. Their grief-a living death.
175
175. Carleson v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 1068, 100 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1972).
